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Abstract  A deferred annuity typically includes an option-like right for the 
policyholder. At the end of the deferment period, he may either choose to 
receive annuity payouts, calculated based on a mortality table agreed to at 
contract inception, or receive the accumulated capital as a lump sum. 
Considering stochastic mortality improvements, such an option could be of 
substantial value. Whenever mortality improves less than originally expected, 
the policyholder will choose the lump sum and buy an annuity on the market 
granting him a better price. If, however, mortality improves more than 
expected, the policyholder will choose to retain the deferred annuity. We use a 
realistically calibrated life-cycle consumption/saving/asset allocation model 
and calculate the welfare gains of deferred annuities under stochastic Lee-
Carter mortality. Our results are relevant both for individual retirement 
planning and for policymakers, especially if legislation makes annuitization, at 
least in part, mandatory. Our results also indicate the maximal willingness to 
pay for the mortality option inherent in deferred annuities, which is of 
relevance to insurance pricing. 
 
Keywords  Stochastic Mortality, Deferred Annuitization, Retirement 
Decisions, Annuity Puzzle, Intertemporal Utility Maximization 
 
JEL-Classification  D14, D81, D91, G11, G22, J11, J26 
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1. Introduction 
 
A life-annuity guarantees the policyholder (annuitant) an income stream as 
long he is alive in exchange for paying a certain amount of money (premium) 
to the insurer. Buying an annuity avoids the risk of outliving one’s money. 
Conversely, if the individual chooses to self-annuitize (i.e., manage his own 
pay-out plan), the individual may end up with zero wealth and no income 
while still alive (see Horneff et al., 2008a and the references cited therein). 
Consequently, in the literature, annuitization is regarded as quite valuable for 
risk-averse individuals (see Section 2). 
 
A deferred annuity, i.e., an annuity that does not pay out immediately but at 
some predefined future date, typically comes with an option-like right for the 
insured. At the end of the deferral period, he may either choose to receive 
annuity payouts or receive the accumulated capital as a lump sum. 
 
The mortality table used to calculate these payouts is typically agreed upon at 
contract inception. Considering stochastic mortality improvements, such an 
option can be of substantial value. Whenever mortality improves less than 
originally expected, the annuitant will choose the lump sum and buy an 
annuity on the market at a better price. However, if mortality improves more 
than expected, he will choose to retain the deferred annuity. A deferred 
annuity thus protects the individual from the risk of high annuity prices in the 
future while providing the opportunity to make a better deal in case of low 
prices. 
 
From the perspective of an insurance company the value of this type of option 
is estimated by Toplek (2007) using financial pricing methods in a perfect 
market environment, based on previous work by Milevsky and Promislow 
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(2001), Boyle and Hardy (2003), Pelsser (2003), Biffis and Millossovich 
(2006), and Ballotta and Haberman (2006). 
 
In this contribution, we take the perspective of a risk-averse individual facing 
incomplete markets who wants to maximize expected utility. We use a 
realistically calibrated life-cycle consumption/saving/asset allocation model 
and calculate the welfare gains of deferred annuities under stochastic Lee-
Carter mortality taking borrowing and short-selling constraints into 
consideration. Our results are of considerable interest for individual retirement 
planning and for policymakers, especially if legislation makes annuitization, at 
least in part, mandatory as has occurred in the United Kingdom (see Cannon 
and Tonks, 2008). Our results also reveal the maximal price above the 
expected value a risk-averse individual would pay for deferred annuities and 
the willingness to pay for the mortality-related option. 
 
Our results confirm the findings of the optimal annuitization literature: 
annuitization is found to be welfare enhancing considering deferred annuities 
in a stochastic mortality environment. The option related to fluctuations in 
mortality, however, appears to be of little value to individuals, with higher 
values found for middle-aged, patient, and risk-averse individuals. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a 
literature survey. The stochastic process for mortality is introduced in Section 
3. The formal model is developed and calibrated in Section 4. Results are 
presented in Section 5 and a summary and discussion are found in Section 6. 
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2. Related Literature 
 
Initiated by the seminal work of Yaari (1965), a broad literature has developed 
that investigates optimal strategies involving immediate annuities under 
deterministic mortality, for example, with respect to the amount of wealth to 
be annuitized, optimal timing of annuity purchases, or the type of annuity to 
be purchased.1 According to this literature, being able to insure longevity risk 
via annuitization generally increases the utility of a risk-averse individual. In 
reality however, annuitization rates are much lower than one would expect 
from the results of these models (see, e.g., Moore and Mitchell, 1997), a 
contradiction that is called the “annuity puzzle.” The literature suggests 
several explanations for this puzzle, including: annuities may be too expensive 
due to adverse selection; annuities may induce a suboptimal consumption 
profile or asset allocation, bequest motives, the crowding-out effect of 
government pensions, intra-family risk sharing, the insolvency risk of the 
insurer, and the background risk of government pensions under stochastic 
mortality. Furthermore, behavioral biases, like framing, are found to induce a 
low demand (Agnew et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2008). 
 
In the context of immediate annuitization, stochastic mortality is analyzed by 
Menoncin (2008) and Schulze and Post (2009). Menoncin (2008) studies 
consumption and asset allocation decisions under stochastic mortality of an 
agent having access to longevity bonds. The model does not impose borrowing 
or short-selling constraints and allows for continuous trading in the longevity 
                                                 
1  See Richard (1975), Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Merton (1983), Friedman and 
Warshawsky (1988), Brugiavini (1993), Mitchell et al. (1999), Brown and Poterba 
(2000), Brown (2001), Milevsky and Young (2003, 2007), Dushi and Webb (2004), Vidal 
and Lejárraga (2004, 2006), Davidoff et al. (2005), Babbel and Merrill (2006), Hainaut 
and Devolder (2006), Post et al. (2006), Gupta and Li (2007), Lopes and Michaelides 
(2007), Inkmann et al. (2007), Horneff et al. (2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e), Huang et al. 
(2008), Koijen et al. (2008), Purcal and Piggott (2008), Yogo (2008), Davidoff (2009). 
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bond. The individual can adjust his mortality risk hedging portfolio 
continuously. Menoncin (2008) does not account for the irreversibility of 
annuitization decisions or for the fact that hedging opportunities for most 
individuals are far less than perfect. It is shown that a longevity bond is always 
welfare enhancing and that the share invested should decrease over the 
lifetime because the uncertainty surrounding future mortality developments 
decreases with the length of the planning horizon. Schulze and Post (2009) 
analyze the annuity demand of an individual who is able to buy annuities only 
at a certain age with no opportunity to cancel or sell the contract later, thus 
taking into consideration the irreversibility of annuitization decisions. The 
authors show, given shocks to mortality rates are mean preserving, that 
annuity demand is not influenced by introducing stochastic mortality if the 
argument of the utility function (consumption) is stochastically independent of 
mortality risks. However, in their analysis of situations involving mortality-
driven insolvency risk of the annuity provider or background risk induced by a 
mortality dependent government pension income stream, they find that annuity 
demand may, dependent on the severity of the insolvency risk, increase or 
decrease compared to a situation without stochastic mortality or without such 
dependencies. 
 
The optimal demand for deferred annuities under deterministic mortality is 
studied in Gong and Webb (2007) and Horneff and Maurer (2008). Horneff 
and Maurer (2008) find that optimal strategies involving deferred annuities are 
very similar to strategies involving immediate annuities. Because they do not 
consider stochastic mortality in their model, they do not take into 
consideration the option features included in deferred annuities. Gong and 
Webb (2007) show that under reasonable assumptions about actuarial 
unfairness, deferred annuities might be preferred over immediate annuities due 
to a better mortality credit versus loading tradeoff. 
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Milevsky and Kyrychenko (2008) study the welfare and asset allocation 
implications of an option, similar to the one considered here, that is included 
in some variable annuity contracts. The so-called guaranteed minimum income 
benefit (GMIB) option allows the annuitant to convert a fixed amount of 
money at a specified date via guaranteed annuity rates or to take the money 
and buy annuities on the market. However, Milevsky and Kyrychenko (2008) 
do not consider stochastic mortality. In their analysis, the option’s value is 
solely driven by the stochastic investment return of the money invested in the 
annuity, which determines whether or not the annuitant should exercise the 
GMIB option. 
 
In summary, in the literature, immediate annuitization has been analyzed 
under deterministic and stochastic mortality. Deferred annuitization, however, 
has only been analyzed under deterministic mortality to date. Thus, our study 
of deferred annuitization under stochastic mortality is an important 
contribution to the field. 
 
 
3. A Lee-Carter Type Stochastic Process for Mortality 
 
Several models for stochastic mortality are discussed in the literature (see, 
e.g., Cairns et al., 2008), but the model we use is one of the earliest proposed 
and now one of the most widely used—the Lee-Carter model (Lee and Carter, 
1992). According to this model, the log of the central death rate mx,t for a 
given age x at time t is given by 
 
ln(mx,t) = ax + bxkt , (1)
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where ax and bx are age-specific constants and kt, the mortality index, is a 
random variable, whose realization defines a complete mortality table for 
given values of ax and bx.2 
 
Following Lee and Carter (1992), kt is assumed to follow a random walk with 
drift. Thus kt is given by 
 
kt = kt-1 + θ + εt ,  (2)
 
where εt is normally distributed with E[εt] = 0 and Std[εt] = σε. The final 
variable of interest for the expected-utility maximization and annuity pricing 
framework, the one-period survival probability for age x at time t, px,t, is then 
given by3 
 
px,t = 1 – mx,t / (1 + 0.5mx,t), (3)
 
which means that the individual and the insurer hold symmetric beliefs as to 
the distribution of future mortality4 and that there is no difference between 
individual mortality and aggregate mortality. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  As in Bauer and Weber (2008), we ignore age-specific mortality shocks. 
3  The conversion of central death rates into survival rates is based on the approximation 
given in Cairns et al. (2008). 
4  For annuity demand under asymmetric mortality beliefs (i.e., information uncertainty) 
and heterogeneity of mortality rates in the population of annuitants, see Brugavani (1993) 
and Sheshinski (2007). 
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4. Preferences, Decisions Alternatives, and Optimization Problem 
4.1 Preferences 
 
The individual derives utility from consumption C (all monetary variables are 
in nominal terms) over his stochastic lifespan. The intertemporally separable 
utility function U(C), following the standard discounted utility model, is 
defined as: 
 
( ) ( )0
0 ,0
0 0
T x t
t
i x t t
t i
U C p U Cδ
−
+
= =
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∏ , (4)
 
where T denotes the maximum lifespan, x0 the individual’s current age, δ the 
subjective discount factor, and px,0 the individual’s probability of surviving 
from age x to x + 1 given the mortality table information at t = 0. The 
individual has no bequest motives; thus, the one-period CRRA-utility function 
Ut(Ct), with γ as the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is given by: 
 
( )
( )
( )
1
log , for 1
1
1
1
,otherwise
1
t
t
t t
t
t
C
U C C
γ
γπ
π
γ
−
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎪ =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎪= ⎨⎛ ⎞⎪ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪ +⎝ ⎠⎪ −⎩
 (5)
 
as long as the individual lives; 0 otherwise. Nominal consumption at time t, Ct, 
is adjusted for inflation at rate π. 
 
 
 
 
 
 9
4.2 Decision Alternatives 
4.2.1 General Decisions in Each Period 
 
At each point in time, t, the individual must decide on the amount of wealth to 
be consumed, Ct, which implicitly determines savings, St. Wealth at time t is 
denoted by Wt. Savings St = Wt – Ct are invested at the risk-free return Rf. The 
individual cannot borrow money. Initial wealth is given by W0. 
 
 
4.2.2 Only Immediate Annuities are Available 
 
We compare two annuitization decision alternatives. Under the first, the 
individual can buy only immediate annuities with nominally fixed and 
constant payouts at age 65 (t = 65 – x0). He pays a premium PI, with 0 ≤ PI ≤ 
065 x
W − . For every $1 of premium paid, the annuity pays AI. The insurance 
company prices the annuity according to the principle of equivalence, given 
information about the mortality index 
065 x
k − , but may include a loading factor 
L, with L ≥ 0. Given that the individual and the insurer hold symmetric beliefs 
regarding the distribution of kt, the annuity payout per $1 premium paid is 
derived at age 65 according to: 
 
( )
( )
0
0
1
65,65 165
0
65
1
1 1 E
j
i x iT
i
I x j
j f
p
L A
R
−
+ − + +−
=
−
=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥= + ⋅ ⋅ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∏
∑ , (6)
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where Et denotes the expected value operator with respect to the information 
available at time t.5 Immediate annuities, as well as deferred annuities (in the 
pay-out phase), are irreversible decisions, i.e., the policies cannot be sold or 
canceled. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the individual’s consumption and wealth evolve over 
time (conditional on survival) given that only immediate annuities are 
available. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the Individual’s Consumption and Wealth Over 
Time When Only Immediate Annuities are Available 
 
 
                                                 
5  Pricing the annuity as in Equation (6) does not explicitly account for the possibility that 
mortality risks may be systematic, i.e., be stochastically dependent of capital market 
returns. This independence assumption follows the model used in Gründl et al. (2006). 
Note, however, that the loading factor L, can be interpreted as an implicit risk premium 
charged for systematic mortality risk. See also Dahl and Møller (2008), Ludkovski and 
Young (2008), and Delong (2009) for pricing approaches under stochastic mortality, and 
Van de Ven and Weale (2008) for a general equilibrium analysis of annuity pricing under 
stochastic mortality. For the case of stochastic interest rates, see Nielsen and Zenios 
(1996). 
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The utility the individual receives in this scenario (the first annuitization 
decision alternative) serves as the benchmark utility, i.e., it is the utility in a 
world without deferred annuities. 
 
 
4.2.3 Immediate and Deferred Annuities are Available 
 
Under the second alternative, both deferred annuities and immediate annuities 
are available. The deferred annuity considered here is a variant of a variable 
annuity that allows the policyholder a maximum amount of flexibility during 
the accumulation phase with respect both to consumption purposes and the 
amount to be annuitized at retirement age. The only parameter that is fixed at 
t = 0 is the future conversion factor, i.e., the payout per $1 premium paid at 
age 65 should the individual annuitize instead of taking the lump sum. This 
flexibility is achieved by a variable annuity having the following contract 
characteristics:6 
 
- Single premium payment, paid at t = 0; 
- Money that is invested at t = 0 is accumulated in a fund earning the 
risk-free return Rf (as savings outside an annuity would earn), 
- Guaranteed minimum death benefit (during the deferral period) 
(GMDB) equal to the fund value 
- Guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit (GMWB) smaller or equal to 
the fund value (during the deferral period); 
- Guaranteed minimum income benefit (GMIB) granting the annuity 
payout per $ of the fund value at retirement age or the right to take the 
fund value at the end of the deferral period as a lump sum. 
                                                 
6  For an overview of contract characteristics and options of variable annuities, see, e.g., 
Bauer et al. (2008). 
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In summary, then, because the amount invested at t = 0 earns the same return 
as private savings, withdrawals are possible, and in the case of death during 
the deferral period all remaining money would be paid out to heirs; the 
resulting contract structure is identical to the situation before age 65 where no 
annuities (or only immediate annuities) are available, i.e., private savings are 
perfectly replicated in the product. Formally, the fund value of the deferred 
annuity at the beginning of each period can identically be denoted by Wt 
before taking out money, and by St. afterward. Consequently, during the 
deferral period, we will abstract from the existence of the contract. The only 
difference between this situation and the one where only immediate annuities 
are available is that, at retirement age, the individual can choose between the 
conversion factors of the deferred annuity and, by taking out the fund value as 
a lump sum, the conversion factors given by the market in annuitizing his 
money. 
 
Thus, at age 65, the individual can flexibly invest his wealth in this annuity by 
paying a premium PD or refuse to invest and buy an immediate annuity with a 
price based on mortality information available at t = 65 – x0 for paying the 
premium PI, when exercising the lump-sum option. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the individual’s consumption and wealth 
over time (conditional on survival) given that both immediate and deferred 
annuities are available. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the Individual’s Consumption and Wealth Over 
Time When Both Immediate and Deferred Annuities are Available 
 
 
 
The deferred annuity’s payout per $1 premium is given by: 
 
This pricing mechanism is very similarly to that of Equation (6); the only 
difference being in the expected value operator, which is now conditional on 
the information available at t = 0. Note that in order to derive the maximal 
increase in utility an annuitant could derive from this product,7 we do not 
include any price adjustment that accounts for the options inherent in this 
annuity. In other words, we are concerned with how much the individual 
would be willing to pay to have those options. 
 
                                                 
7  See Toplek (2007) and the references cited therein for the pricing of such options. 
( )
( )
0
1
65,65 165
0
0
1
1 1 E
j
i x iT
i
D j
j f
p
L A
R
−
+ − + +−
=
=
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥= + ⋅ ⋅ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∏
∑ . (7)
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In general, the budget restriction at age 65 under the second alternative is 
0 ≤ PI + PD ≤ 065 xW − , with neither PI and PD allowed to be negative. However, 
at age 65, depending on realization of the mortality index 
065 x
k − , the individual 
will buy only one of the two annuity products. Whenever 
065 x
k −  < E0( 065 xk − ), 
i.e., mortality rates are smaller than expected at t = 0, the individual will buy 
the deferred annuity since doing so will result in obtaining a better price for 
the annuity than that available on the current market. In case 
065 x
k −  > E0( 065 xk − ), 
he will buy annuities priced at current market rates. If 
065 x
k −  = E0( 065 xk − ), both 
types of annuity have the same payout per $ of premium and the individual is 
indifferent between them, as choosing an immediate annuity will yield the 
same utility as retaining the deferred one. 
 
 
4.3 Calibration of Model Parameters 
 
To empirically calibrate the Lee-Carter stochastic process for mortality we use 
data from 1950 to 2005 from the Human Mortality Database for U.S. males 
and females and estimate the parameters for the ages 30 to 100 using the 
demography package provided by Hyndman et al. (2008). The estimated 
parameters are given in Appendix A. 
 
For the risk-free return, we use the sample mean of U.S. T-Bill returns as a 
proxy. Using the same sample period as for the Lee-Carter estimation (1950 to 
2005), Rf is set to 1.0493 (see Morningstar, 2007). For inflation, we use the 
same sample period, resulting in a value of 0.0390 (see Morningstar, 2007). 
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The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ is set to 1, 2, or 3, and the subjective 
discount factor δ is set to 0.93 or 0.99, both of which are typical values in the 
literature (see, e.g., Laibson et al., 1998). 
 
The loading factor L is either set to 0 (no loading) or to 0.1, which is in the 
range of pricing markups for the U.S. annuity market reported in Mitchell et 
al. (1999). 
 
 
4.4 Objective Function and Solving Technique 
 
The individual’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of consumption: 
 
( )( )0, ,max EI Dt P PC U C , (8)
 
subject to consumption constraints: 
 
{ }
{ }
0 0 0
0
0 0 0
1 0
65 64 65
65
1 0 0 0
1, 2,...,64
66 ,67 ,..., ,
t
t
t t f t
x x f x I D
x
t t f I I D D t
C W S
C S R S t x
W
C S R S P P
W
C S R A P A P S t x x T x
W
−
− − −
−
−
= −
= − ∀ ∈ −
= − − −
= + + − ∀ ∈ − − −
123
14243
144424443
 
 
(9)
 
subject to borrowing constraints: 
 
{ }
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
65 65
0 1,2,...,64 ,66 ,67 ,...,
0
t t
x I D x
C W S
S W t x x x T x
S P P W− −
= −
≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ − − − −
≤ + + ≤
 (10)
 
and subject to no-short-sale constraints: 
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0 ≤ PI, 0 ≤ PD. (11)
 
The optimization problem (Equations (8)–(11)) is solved backward via 
stochastic dynamic programming. The Bellman equation for this problem 
depends on three state variables: time t, wealth Wt, and the mortality index kt. 
The Bellman equation (with V denoting the value function) is given for t = 0, 
1, …, T – x0 – 1 by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }, 1 1 1, ,, max E ,I Dtt t t t t t x t t t tP PCV W k U C p V W kδ + + +⎡ ⎤= + ⎣ ⎦ , (12)
 
subject to the constraints of Equations (9)–(11).8 In the last period, remaining 
wealth is consumed, and the value function is given by ( )
0 0T x T x
U W− − . The 
Bellman equation (Equation (12)) cannot be solved analytically; hence a 
numerical technique is used. First, at each point in time t, the Wt-state and the 
kt-state spaces are discretized into a grid of N × M points, Wtn, with n = 1, 2, 
…, N, and ktm, with m = 1, 2, …, M. To calculate the distribution of the one-
period survival probabilities px,t, the distribution of the mortality index kt is 
discretized using Gaussian quadrature methods. Since in the last period (i.e., at 
t = T – x0), the value function ( )0 0T x T xV W− −  is given by ( )0 0T x T xU W− − , the 
numerical solution algorithm starts at the penultimate period (i.e., at t = T –
 x0 – 1). For each (Wtn, ktm) combination, Equation (12) is solved with the 
MATHEMATICA® 7.0 implemented nonlinear optimizer NMaximize, yielding 
the optimal decisions Ctnm (Wtn, ktm), ( )0 065 65,nm n mI x xP W k− − , ( )0 065 65,nm n mD x xP W k− − , and 
the function value of Vt(Wtn, ktm). Next, a continuous function is fitted to the 
points Vt(Wtn, ktm), which delivers a continuous approximation of the value 
function Vt(Wt, kt). Finally, the problem is rolled back to the preceding period. 
 
                                                 
8  Note that the decision on the optimal values for PI and PD is made only at t = 65 – x0. 
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5. Results 
5.1 The Welfare Gain Measure 
 
To calculate the welfare gain of deferred annuitization, we use an equivalent 
wealth variation measure (see Brown, 2001). The general idea is to compare 
the expected utility of an individual having access only to immediate annuities 
with an individual who has access to both immediate and deferred annuities 
and express it in monetary terms. 
 
The reference point for our analyses is the welfare gain the individual achieves 
through the availability of only immediate annuities WGI. This welfare gain is 
calculated by comparing the expected utility of an individual having no access 
to any type of annuity versus an individual having access to immediate 
annuities. WGI, is derived in Equation (14), i.e., by solving Equation (13) for 
∆W0, I and dividing it by W0 to obtain a relative measure: 
 
( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0, 0, | 0, 0 , | 0, 0I D I I DV W k P P V W W k P P≥ = = + ∆ = = , (13)
 
WGI = ∆W0, I / W0. (14)
 
WGI measures how much expected utility increases translated into monetary 
terms when the individual can access the immediate annuity market (vs. 
having no access). Note that due to the CRRA-feature of the one-period utility 
function (Equation (5)), WGI, for each combination of model parameters, is a 
constant, i.e., independent of W0. 
 
The welfare gain in the case that both immediate and deferred annuities are 
available (vs. no annuities at all), WGID, is derived according to Equations (15) 
and (16): 
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( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0, 0, | 0, 0 , | 0, 0I D ID I DV W k P P V W W k P P≥ ≥ = + ∆ = = , (15)
 
WGID = ∆W0, ID / W0. (16)
 
To measure the sole impact of introducing deferred annuities into the market, 
the incremental welfare gain WGD is given by: 
 
WGD = WGID – WGI .  (17)
 
 
5.2 Numerical Results 
 
To illustrate the impact of randomness in future mortality rates on future 
annuity payouts, we first show, in Figure 3, the distribution of payouts from an 
immediate annuity AI and the fixed payout of the deferred annuity AD at age 65 
for an individual aged 30 at t = 0. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Payouts per $1 Premium for Immediate Annuity 
AI and Deferred Annuity AD at Age 65 for a at t = 0 30-Year-Old 
Individual; Loading L = 0 
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Figure 3 illustrates the option inherent in the deferred annuity. If the payout 
falls to the left of the dashed horizontal lines depicting the fixed payout from 
the deferred annuity AD, the individual would stay with the deferred annuity. 
If, however, the payout falls to the right of the dashed lines, the individual 
would exercise the lump-sum option and buy immediate annuities. 
 
The randomness of payouts influences both the welfare gain achieved from 
immediate annuitization WGI or deferred annuitization WGID at age 65, as well 
as the optimal amount of money, PI or PD, to be annuitized. An example of 
both impacts, again for an individual initially aged 30, is shown in Figures 4 
and 5. Here, the welfare gains and optimal amounts of money to be annuitized 
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are shown as a function in the realized value of the mortality index at age 65 
065 x
k − . 
 
Figure 4: Welfare Gain of Immediate Annuitization WGI vs. Deferred 
Annuitization WGID at Age 65; Initial Age x0 = 30, Gender = Male, 
Loading L = 0 
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Figure 5: Optimal Amount of Money Annuitized at Age 65 as a Fraction 
of Wealth at Age 65 
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/I xP W − vs. 065/D xP W − ; Initial Age x0 = 30, Gender = 
Male, Loading L = 0 
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Figure 4 shows that the welfare gain of annuitization is increased by the 
availability of deferred annuities when the mortality index realizes at relatively 
low values. This is the case when mortality has decreased more than expected 
and the conversion factor from the deferred annuity grants better rates than the 
market. Furthermore, Figure 4 illustrates that stochastic mortality has an 
impact not only on the price of annuities, but on the utility evaluation as well, 
because the survival probabilities work as weights for future utility (compare 
Equations (4) and (12)). Due to this, the welfare gain for an individual who 
stays with the deferred annuity, even though the conversion factor is a 
constant, is not independent from the realized mortality index. If the individual 
buys the deferred annuity, the realized survival probabilities, i.e., the weights 
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for future utility, are comparably high, and thus the welfare gain of deferred 
annuitization increases the smaller the realized mortality index becomes. This 
effect also explains why even in case of buying fixed-price deferred annuities, 
optimal annuitization as shown in Figure 5 is a function in the realized 
mortality index. 
 
We next analyze the welfare gain at the point in time when the decision about 
investing savings in the deferred annuity fund must be made (t = 0). In 
particular, we look at the impact of model parameters on the welfare gain. As 
a measure of welfare gain we concentrate on the incremental welfare gain 
WGD the individual experiences through the availability of deferred annuities 
(compare Equation (17)). Figure 6 plots the incremental welfare gain as a 
function in the initial age of the individual x0, the relative risk aversion 
parameter γ, and the subjective discount factor δ. 
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Figure 6: Incremental Welfare Gain of Deferred Annuitization WGID at 
Time t = 0 as a Function in Age at t = 0 x0; Gender = Male, Loading L = 0 
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Figure 6 reveals the striking result that the incremental welfare gain at t = 0 is 
small, ranging between 0.09% and 0.4% of the individual’s initial resources. 
Deferred annuitization can improve welfare at age 65 considerably, compared 
to immediate annuitization (compare Figure 2), but, from the perspective of 
the present, i.e., the age when the decision on investing savings into a deferred 
annuity has to be made, the incremental welfare gain is small. Two factors are 
responsible for this effect. First, the probability of realizing very large welfare 
gains from deferred annuities is rather small, as can be seen from the 99% 
confidence band for the realization of the mortality index at age 65, shown in 
Figure 4 for an individual aged 30. Second, the incremental welfare gain 
possibly realized at age 65 is evaluated at present time, i.e., after being 
discounted for many periods with the subjective discount factor δ and the 
survival probabilities (compare Equation (4)). The discounting effect is 
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confirmed by comparing the curve for the subjective discount factor δ = 0.93 
with the higher welfare gains curve showing δ = 0.99. 
 
Both effects result in a hump-shaped age profile of the incremental welfare 
gain. For younger individuals, future welfare gains are heavily discounted, 
yielding an increasing function in age first. The older the individual is at t = 0, 
the fewer periods there are for mortality to fluctuate (the 99% confidence band 
for 
065 x
k − becomes smaller). Due to this, the option value of deferred annuities 
decreases in initial age, which explains the decreasing part of the function,9 
where the effect of less heavily discounting is overcompensated by the 
shrinking option value. 
 
Increasing risk aversion leads to larger incremental welfare gains because 
optimal annuitization increases, and the welfare gain of annuitization 
increases. 
 
As a final variation in the model input parameters, we look at the impact of 
gender and the loading factor L on incremental welfare gains WGD. The results 
can be found in Table 1, together with the welfare gains WGID for initial ages 
30 and 50. 
                                                 
9  This confirms the results of Menoncin (2008), who shows that the demand for mortality 
hedging instruments is decreasing over the life-cycle. 
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Table 1: Welfare Gain of Deferred Annuitization WGID, Incremental Welfare Gain of Deferred Annuitization WGD, and 
Optimal Savings S0 / W0 at Time t = 0 and Impact of Gender, Loading L, Relative Risk Aversion γ, and Subjective 
Discount Factor δ 
0.93 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.99
WG ID 1.00% 9.41% 4.46% 11.65% 7.01% 12.60% 0.60% 6.64% 3.17% 8.60% 5.22% 9.42%
WG D 0.05% 0.32% 0.14% 0.35% 0.20% 0.36% 0.04% 0.31% 0.15% 0.35% 0.21% 0.37%
S 0 / W 0 92.63% 97.49% 95.37% 97.60% 96.21% 97.65% 92.63% 97.49% 95.40% 97.63% 96.25% 97.69%
WG ID 0.85% 8.26% 3.69% 9.32% 5.56% 9.69% 0.43% 5.15% 2.27% 5.97% 3.58% 6.24%
WG D 0.05% 0.33% 0.15% 0.35% 0.21% 0.36% 0.04% 0.32% 0.15% 0.35% 0.21% 0.37%
S 0 / W 0 92.76% 97.66% 95.48% 97.74% 96.32% 97.77% 92.76% 97.66% 95.51% 97.77% 96.37% 97.82%
WG ID 5.38% 19.02% 13.70% 23.17% 18.32% 24.84% 3.43% 13.84% 10.04% 17.53% 13.95% 18.99%
WG D 0.14% 0.35% 0.24% 0.38% 0.29% 0.40% 0.12% 0.34% 0.24% 0.37% 0.29% 0.39%
S 0 / W 0 91.74% 96.24% 94.34% 96.45% 95.15% 96.55% 91.74% 96.24% 94.43% 96.53% 95.27% 96.66%
WG ID 4.42% 16.12% 11.11% 18.12% 14.27% 18.73% 2.43% 10.59% 7.22% 12.25% 9.68% 12.72%
WG D 0.08% 0.20% 0.14% 0.21% 0.17% 0.22% 0.06% 0.19% 0.14% 0.21% 0.16% 0.22%
S 0 / W 0 92.05% 96.61% 94.64% 96.77% 95.45% 96.85% 92.05% 96.61% 94.73% 96.85% 95.57% 96.96%
2 3
Loading Factor L
0 0.1
γ γ
δ δ
1 2
δ δ δ δ
3 1
Age 
x 0
30 Gender
Male
Female
50 Gender
Male
Female
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Gender has an impact on the welfare gains of deferred annuitization WGID, 
resulting in higher gains for males. Males have lower survival probabilities 
and thus the mortality credit of the annuity is larger for them.10 For males the 
incremental gains WGD are also higher at age 50, confirming that annuitization 
is more utility enhancing for them. The incremental gains are nearly identical 
for both genders at age 30 because the originally higher gains for males at 
annuitization age 65 are (due to their lower survival probabilities) more 
heavily discounted to t = 0, which is more pronounced for younger 
individuals. 
 
The impact of the loading factor on the welfare gains of deferred annuitization 
WGID, is straightforward. Making annuities more expensive decreases their 
attractiveness. The incremental welfare gain WGD, however, is only barely 
affected by introducing a loading. Deferred annuitization becomes less 
attractive but, at the same time, the benchmark for measuring the incremental 
gain, the welfare gain in a world with only immediate annuities WGI, also 
decreases with a positive loading factor. 
 
With respect to the pricing of deferred annuities, Table 1 indicates that the 
price markups above the expected value of payouts an insurer could charge 
would be fairly small. The maximal price markup can be calculated by setting 
the incremental welfare gain WGD (i.e., the amount of money the individual is 
willing to give up in order to have access to deferred annuities) in relation to 
the amount of money invested in the deferred annuity fund at t = 0, i.e., 
savings S0. With fairly priced (expected value of payouts = price) annuities, 
                                                 
10  This result also shows the general direction the results would change if a specific 
mortality table for annuitants, reflecting their above-average life expectancy, is 
considered. Welfare gains would decrease for both the typical annuitant and typical 
nonannuitant. For typical annuitants, the lower mortality credit drives this result; for 
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the range for maximal price markups is 0.05% to 0.4% of the money paid into 
the deferred annuity at t = 0. If both immediate and deferred annuities already 
have a 10% loading factor, the additional price markup ranges between 0.04% 
and 0.4%. 
 
 
6. Summary and Discussion 
 
Deferred annuities improve the welfare of a risk-averse individual in the 
presence of stochastic mortality. Our analysis confirms the results in the 
optimal annuitization literature for the case of both deterministic and 
stochastic mortality for immediate annuities and in the case of deterministic 
mortality for deferred annuities. 
 
The incremental gains, i.e., the option value connected to stochastic mortality, 
of deferred annuities appear to be small. In pricing these products, an insurer 
can expect that CRRA-individuals are willing to pay only around 0.04% to 
0.4% of the money invested in the deferred annuity fund at the beginning of 
the deferral period in exchange for an option right related to stochastic 
mortality improvements (given that the benchmark investment, the immediate 
annuity, comes with the same initial loading factor L). In general, the 
incremental gains and possible price markups are higher for individuals who 
are 45 to 60 years of age, are more patient and have greater risk aversion. 
 
In contrast to actual price markups for options related to deferred annuitization 
in variable annuities (GMIB’s), the price markups calculated here seem to 
leave no room for a market because the actual markups are in the range of 
                                                                                                                                          
typical nonannuitants, i.e., individuals with average mortality, the increased unfairness of 
annuities makes annuitization less valuable. 
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0.5% to 0.75% per annum of the fund value during the deferment period (see, 
e.g., Bauer et al., 2008). It should be noted, however, that the products usually 
also allow investment in risk assets, such as mutual funds. Thus, the price 
charged needs to cover more than the stochastic mortality driven part of the 
option, including, for example, minimum interest rate guarantees, which are, 
of course, also valuable from the individual’s perspective (see Milevsky and 
Kyrychenko, 2008). 
 
A possible policy implication of our results is that mandatory annuitization 
schemes should not necessarily require the purchase of deferred annuities 
because the option value from the individual’s perspective is very small and 
may be easily overcompensated by price markups by insurance companies. 
 
Our work could be extended by considering shocks to individual mortality, 
e.g., due to health risks as in Horneff et al. (2008b) and Davidoff (2009). In 
this case, the option value inherent in deferred annuities will increase because 
the variation of mortality from the individual’s perspective will increase. 
Another idea for future research is to consider deferred annuities where the 
amount of money is already fixed at t = 0. In this case, the welfare gains of 
deferred annuitization could either increase or decrease. Increases could occur 
due to the higher mortality credits of such products (see Gong and Webb, 
2007) because, usually, if death occurs during the deferment period no money 
is returned (while payouts in case of survival are higher). Decreases could 
occur due to the higher utility costs of inflexibility with respect to 
consumption needs during the deferment period and the amount of money to 
be annuitized at retirement age. 
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Appendix A. Estimated Parameters for the Lee-Carter Model 
 
Drift of k t : θ
Standard deviation: σ ε
Age x a x b x a x b x Age x a x b x a x b x
30 -6.3127 0.0085 -7.0801 0.0170 66 -3.4843 0.0195 -4.0889 0.0130
31 -6.2663 0.0078 -6.9910 0.0167 67 -3.4027 0.0194 -3.9985 0.0135
32 -6.2160 0.0086 -6.9201 0.0176 68 -3.3223 0.0182 -3.9098 0.0132
33 -6.1676 0.0086 -6.8464 0.0171 69 -3.2524 0.0174 -3.8318 0.0134
34 -6.1361 0.0090 -6.7844 0.0175 70 -3.1577 0.0175 -3.7182 0.0141
35 -6.0676 0.0098 -6.7042 0.0179 71 -3.0931 0.0161 -3.6469 0.0135
36 -6.0042 0.0102 -6.6238 0.0172 72 -2.9928 0.0168 -3.5229 0.0147
37 -5.9372 0.0104 -6.5456 0.0172 73 -2.9212 0.0158 -3.4373 0.0147
38 -5.8428 0.0111 -6.4402 0.0169 74 -2.8412 0.0162 -3.3465 0.0158
39 -5.7948 0.0134 -6.3820 0.0185 75 -2.7567 0.0161 -3.2405 0.0165
40 -5.7111 0.0140 -6.2908 0.0184 76 -2.6804 0.0153 -3.1517 0.0162
41 -5.6254 0.0136 -6.2080 0.0176 77 -2.6034 0.0145 -3.0632 0.0161
42 -5.5307 0.0155 -6.1041 0.0183 78 -2.5252 0.0143 -2.9610 0.0169
43 -5.4539 0.0157 -6.0209 0.0178 79 -2.4405 0.0140 -2.8589 0.0167
44 -5.3787 0.0169 -5.9520 0.0179 80 -2.3416 0.0141 -2.7539 0.0159
45 -5.2841 0.0179 -5.8633 0.0177 81 -2.2672 0.0125 -2.6699 0.0147
46 -5.1960 0.0177 -5.7745 0.0174 82 -2.1742 0.0129 -2.5537 0.0150
47 -5.1048 0.0187 -5.6862 0.0177 83 -2.0837 0.0126 -2.4449 0.0151
48 -5.0079 0.0186 -5.5898 0.0164 84 -1.9961 0.0126 -2.3385 0.0151
49 -4.9389 0.0207 -5.5222 0.0177 85 -1.9138 0.0122 -2.2368 0.0148
50 -4.8350 0.0217 -5.4256 0.0179 86 -1.8272 0.0118 -2.1354 0.0140
51 -4.7484 0.0211 -5.3452 0.0164 87 -1.7463 0.0114 -2.0373 0.0134
52 -4.6526 0.0218 -5.2513 0.0165 88 -1.6758 0.0102 -1.9505 0.0124
53 -4.5734 0.0220 -5.1751 0.0161 89 -1.5901 0.0100 -1.8516 0.0116
54 -4.4915 0.0229 -5.1022 0.0163 90 -1.5085 0.0097 -1.7406 0.0121
55 -4.3999 0.0221 -5.0221 0.0150 91 -1.4471 0.0078 -1.6747 0.0095
56 -4.3183 0.0220 -4.9356 0.0143 92 -1.3567 0.0074 -1.5694 0.0093
57 -4.2369 0.0221 -4.8589 0.0139 93 -1.2755 0.0066 -1.4768 0.0085
58 -4.1351 0.0209 -4.7559 0.0127 94 -1.2085 0.0051 -1.3886 0.0079
59 -4.0633 0.0218 -4.6867 0.0133 95 -1.1437 0.0042 -1.3110 0.0068
60 -3.9609 0.0216 -4.5848 0.0136 96 -1.0715 0.0030 -1.2370 0.0055
61 -3.8862 0.0207 -4.5060 0.0124 97 -1.0183 0.0018 -1.1663 0.0044
62 -3.7818 0.0206 -4.3951 0.0130 98 -0.9831 -0.0003 -1.1101 0.0031
63 -3.7137 0.0205 -4.3290 0.0129 99 -0.9600 -0.0040 -1.0858 -0.0008
64 -3.6384 0.0204 -4.2545 0.0132 100 -0.8900 -0.0023 -0.9931 0.0014
65 -3.5464 0.0207 -4.1519 0.0139
1.1526
Males
-0.6818
0.9766
Males FemalesFemales
-0.8209
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